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RECENT FEDERAL AND AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY REFORM INITIATIVES 
M .  Stuart Madden 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
In 1993 both the United States Senate and the American Law Institute waded 
once more into the swampy reaches of products liability reform and reconciliation. 
On the legislative side, in March 199 3 the Senate Commerce, Science and Transpor- 
tation Committee received for review S. 687, the Product Liability Fairness Act 
of 1993 .' On April 30, 1993, H.R. 19 10, the Fairness in Product Liability Act,2 
was forwarded jointly to the House Judiciary Committee and the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee. On May 5, a second product liability bill, H.R. 1954, 
was submitted simultaneously to the same two House committees.' 
In May 1992 the Council of the American Law Institute decided to begin a 
Restatement (Third) of Torts and to make its first initiative a Restatement of 
Products Liability. On April 20, 199 3 ,  the Reporters for this project, Professors 
Aaron D. Twerski of Brooklyn Law School and James A. Henderson, Jr. of Cornell 
Law School, published their "Preliminary Draft Number No. 1" of the products 
liability component.4 After a late spring and summer of energetic exchange with 
lawyers, jurists, and teachers, both within the Institute and beyond, the Reporters 
published "Council Draft No. I"' for presentation to the sixty-one member ALI 
Council. The Council requested certain revisions that will be incorporated into a 
1 .  S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1 993) [hereinafter Fairness Act]. 
2. H.R. 1910, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
3 .  H.R. 1954. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCE LIABIW (Prelim. Draft No. 1 ,  Apr. 20, 
199 3) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. 
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUC~S LIABILITY (Council Draft No. 1 ,  Sept. 1 7 .  
199 3 )  [hereinafter Council Draft]. 
M .  Stuart M a d h  is Cbarles A. Frueauff Researcb Projissor at tbe Pace University Scbool of 
Law and tbe Cbair oftbe Academic Advisory Subcommittee oftbe Pro&, General Liability and 
Consumer Law Committee o f  tbe Tort and Insurance Practice Section. Mr. Madden wisbes to 
acknowledge tbe rescarcb assistance o f  James Winstein in tbe preparation o f  tbir article. 
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"Council Draft No. 2," which is scheduled for further Council review at its February 
1994 meeting.6 
This article, with some selectivity, will describe and analyze the substance of 
the Senate version of the Product Liability Fairness Act,' as well as the substance 
of Council Draft No. 1 of the Products Liability Restatement. 
11. PRODUCT LIABILITY FAIRNESS ACT OF 1993 (S. 687) 
A. Introduction 
Sponsored by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D., W. Va.), S. 687 is described 
as "[a] bill to regulate interstate commerce by providing for a uniform product 
liability law, and for other purposes."8 The Fairness Act would reform product 
liability significantly in such areas as the avdability of compensatory damages for 
commercial and economic loss, the level of proof sufticient for an award of punitive 
damages, the burden of proof to recover compensatory damages against a nonmanu- 
facturing seller, preemption, alternative dispute resolution, expedited judgments, 
and the admissibility of evidence of collateral benefits as an offset to compensatory 
damages. 
B . Applicability 
The Act applies to "any civil action brought a p n s t  the manufacturer or products 
seller, on any theory, for harm caused by a product."9 However, claims "for loss 
or  damage to a product itself or for commercial loss [are] not subject to [the] 
Act.'"' The Act indicates that such claims are to be "governed by applicable 
commercial or contract law."" It is not clear what effect the authors anticipate 
from the last-mentioned clause; in view of the Fairness Act's preemption clause," 
it would seem that a conclusion that the Act does not apply to a certain claim 
- - .  
would permit a court to apply any appropriate doctrine, be it tort, contract, o r  
otherwise. 
In any event, by excising from the Fairness Act's coverage claims for commercial 
loss and for product disappointment not involving harm to other property, the 
congressional authors chose the widely followed rule that such claims sound properly 
6. Sa infa part V. 
7 .  The substantial similarity between the House and the Senate versions of the Fairness Acts 
invites the convenience of describing the Senate version, S. 687, as representative of the three bills. 
8. Its cosponsors are Senators Gordon of Washington, Liebermann of Connecticut. Danfonh of 
Missouri, and Dodd of Connecticut. 
9 .  Fairness Act, nrpra note 1, 5 qa). 
10. Id 
1 1 .  Id 
1 2 .  Fairness Act 5 qb) provides, in pertinent pan, that the Act "supersedes any state law regarding 
recovery for harm caused by a product only to the extent that this Act establishes a rule of law applicable 
to any such recovery." Id. 5 qb). 
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warranty, not tort." The provision does not recognize the exception, adopted 
several states but scourged by the Supreme Court in East River Steamship Corp. 
14 Transamerica Delaval, Znc., that permits tort recovery for accidents not involving 
harm to persons or property other than the subject product when the accident 
itself is of such a sudden and dangerous character that the absence of harm to 
other property or persons is a mere fortuity." 
C. Preemption 
Section q b )  states that the Act "supersedes any State law regarding recovery for 
harm caused by a product only to the extent that [the] Act establishes a rule of 
law applicable to any such re~overy."'~ Section qc )  specifically excludes preemptive 
effect for a variety of issues, including state choice of law rules, state statutory or 
common-law claims regarding nuisance, and cost recovery actions arising under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 
1980." However, the Fairness Act does afford sweeping dispositive effect to deci- 
sions of the federal courts of appeal, stating that such decisions interpreting or 
applying the Fairness Act "shall be considered a controlling precedent and followed 
by each Federal and State court within the geographical boundaries of the cir- 
cuit[.]"18 It is unlikely that such a provision could be given effect, however, as no 
existing preemption doctrine permits Congress to assign or delegate preemptive 
effect binding state courts to legal interpretations reached by an intermediate federal 
Court. 
D. Expedited Jua'gments and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Title I of the Fairness ~ c t , ' ~  entitled "Expedited Judgments and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Procedures," provides a detailed framework for early resolution of 
covered controversies. 
1. Expedited Judgments 
Section 101 of Title I ("Expedited Product Liability  judgment^")'^ is intended to 
encourage both parties to settle before trial. It provides that the claimant in a 
products liability action may include in the complaint an offer of judgment, in any 
specific dollar amount, "as complete satisfaction of the ~laim."~ '  Likewise, the 
1 3 .  Acwrd Council Draft, supra note 5, 5 101 cmt. r, at 43 ("Liability for harm caused by product 
defects imposed by the rules stated in this Chapter is ton liability, not liability for breach of warranty 
under the Uniform Commercial Code."). 
14. 476 U.S. 858, 868-70 (1986). 
15. Set, rg., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
16. Fairness Act, supra note 1 ,  8 qb). 
17. Id. 5 qc) .  
18. Id. 5 qe) .  
19. Id. 58 101-102. 
20. Id 5 101. 
21. Id. 5 101(a). 
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section also provides that the defendant may "serve an offer to allow judgment 
to be entered against that defendant for a specific dollar amount as complete satisfac- 
tion of the claim."22 The time permitted for defendant to make this offer is the 
longer of (1) the time allowed for responsive pleading under applicable state law 
or (2) sixty days.23 
If, after defendant receives claimant's offer, defendant does not accept claimant's 
offer and suffers a final judgment in a dollar amount larger than the offer, "the 
court shall modify the judgment against that defendant by including in the judgment 
an amount for the claimant's reasonable attorney's fees and costs, not to exceed 
$50,000."~~ If a claimant who receives and does not accept a defendant's offer 
receives a judgment that is less than the defendant's offer, "the court shall reduce 
the amount of the final judgment in such action by that portion of the judgment 
which is allocable to economic loss for which the claimant has received or is entitled 
to receive collateral  benefit^."^' Because the daimant's risk, while material, will 
not exceed the amount of collateral benefits he or she has received, proponents 
of S. 687 observe correctly that its inducements to  accept reasonable settlement 
offers do not levy decimating consequences upon a claimant who improvidently 
declines defendant's offer.26 
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures 
Fairness Act section 102 ("Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures") provides 
that within time periods tracking those for offers of judgment under section 101 
a claimant or defendant may "serve upon an adverse party an offer to proceed 
pursuant to any voluntary, nonbinding alternative dispute resolution procedure 
established or recognized under the law of the State in which the civil action is 
brought or under the rules of the court in which such action is mai~~tained."~' 
This section provides penalties of "reasonable attorney's fees" for a defendant's 
"unreasonable" refusal to proceed when, after trial, "final judgment is entered 
against the defendant for [the] harm caused by a product."2s Section 102 provides 
no reciprocal penalty or  disincentive for a claimant's refusal to use alternative 
dispute resolution. 
22. Id. 5 lOl(b). 
2 3 .  Id. The time period may be extended by court order upon motion of either party. Id. 5 101(c). 
24. Id. 5 lOl(d). 
2 f .  Id. 5 lOl(e). 
26. As Victor E. Schwartz testified before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation 
Committee (September 2 3 ,  1993): 
Any objective person would see that there is a significant imbalance of punishment with regard to 
sanctions for turning down reasonable offers, but the approach compow with the fact that most 
claimants cannot afford to pay a defendant's legal fees. This new approach [of S. 6871 gives claimants 
a new and important weapon to foster settlement[.] 
27. Fairness Act, rupa note 1 ,  5 102(a). 
28. Id. 5 102(b). In determining whether refusal to proceed was in "good faith," the "court shall 
consider such factors as the court deems appropriate." Id. 5 102(c). 
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E .  Liability Standards for Nonmanufacturing Sellen 
Fairness Act Title 11,29 entitled "Standards for Civil Actions," adopts two liability 
standards-the first in negligence and the second in express warranty-for nonmanu- 
facturing product sellers. Section 202(a) states that liability attaches when the claim- 
ant establishes "by a preponderance of the evidence" that: 
(l)(A) the individual product unit which allegedly caused the harm complained of was 
sold by the defendant; (B) the product seller failed to exercise reasonable care with 
respect to the product; and (C) such failure to exercise reasonable care was a proximate 
cause of the claimant's harm; or 
(2)(A) the product seller made an express warranty, independent of any express warranty 
made by a manufacturer as to the same product; (B) the product failed to conform 
to the product seller's warranty; and (C) the failure of the product to conform to the 
product seller's warranty caused the claimant's harm.30 
Section 202(b) authorizes the trier of fact to evaluate the conduct of the nonmanufac- 
turing product seller, including conduct concerning the "construction, inspection, 
or  condition of the product, and any failure of the product seller to pass on adequate 
warnings or instructions from the product's manufacturer about the dangers and 
proper use of the product."3' With its explicit negligence standard for liability of 
the nonmanufacturing seller, the Fairness Act reflects a marked departure from the 
still-prevding rule applying strict products liability to nonpharmaceutical product 
 retailer^.^' T o  ameliorate the harshness befalling a claimant who finds the product 
manufacturer is either insolvent or not amenable to in penonam jurisdiction, the 
Act allows product sellers to be treated as manufacturers for the purpose of civil 
liability when "the manufacturer is not subject to service of process" or "the court 
29. Id. $ 5  201-207. 
30. Id. $ 202(a). 
3 1. Id. 8 ZOZ(b)(l). However, a product seller would not incur liability "based upon an alleged 
failure to provide warnings or instructions unless the daimant establishes that, when the product left 
the possession and control of the product seller," the product seller failed to provide to its vendee 
"pamphlets, booklets, labels, inserts, or other written warnings or instructions" that it received from 
the manufacturer, or failed "to make reasonable efforts to provide users with the warnings" it received 
a@ the sale. Id. § 202(b)(2). 
32. For example, the Council Draft of the Products Liability Restatement, discussed in the second 
part of this Artide, preserves retailer strict liability. See Council Draft, r u p  note 5 ,  § 101. Reporters 
Henderson and Twerski explain: 
A widely shared justification for holding wholesalers and retailers strictly liable for harm caused by 
manufacturing defects is that, as between them and innocent victims who suffer harm because of 
defective products, the product sellers as business entities are in a better position than are individual 
users and consumers to insure against such losses. 
Id. cmt. b, at 8. The Reporters observe that such a rule recognizes that retders may seek indemnity 
from their vendors and that retention of strict tort liability operates as an incentive for wholesalers 
and retailers "to deal only with reputable, financially responsible manufacturers and distributors[.]" 
Id. at 9. 
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determines that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against the 
man~facturer."~' 
F. Punitive Damages 
The Fairness Act also sets standards for punitive damage awards. It provides that 
punitive damages "if otherwise permitted by applicable law" may be awarded to 
claimants who establish that the harm suffered was "the result of conduct manifest- 
ing a manufacturer's or products seller's conscious, flagrant indifference to the 
safety of those persons who might be harmed by the product."34 A simple fdure  
"to exercise reasonable care in choosing among alternative product designs, formula- 
tions, instructions, or warnings is not of itself such conduct."'' Further, a compensa- 
tory damage award is an explicit prerequisite of any punitive award.j6 The Fairness 
Act also sets a "clear and convincing" standard for punitive damages, a rule that 
finds growing support in state products liability statutes,j7 as does the requirement 
of an award of compensatory damages.js 
Section 203 of the Fairness Act sets forth a protocol for the measurement of 
punitive damages, authorizing the trier of fact to consider "all relevant evidence," 
including the financial condition of the defendant; the severity of the harm caused 
by the defendant's conduct; the duration of the conduct or any concealment of 
it by the defendant; the profitability of the conduct to the defendant; the number 
of products sold by the defendant; awards of compensatory, punitive, or exemplary 
damages to similarly situated persons; any criminal penalties imposed on the defen- 
dant as a result of the conduct in question; and the amount of any civil fines 
assessed against the defendant as a result of the conduct in question.39 
While similar in substantial ways to punitive damages criteria adopted by many 
courts and legislatures, this seemingly innocuous recitation of factors that the trier 
of fact may consider has Trojan Horse potential. It suggests unfettered factfinder 
evaluation of diverse circumstances that courts in many jurisdictions have confined 
to particular relevance, i.e., aggravation or mitigation, but not ktber aggravation 
or mitigation as the trier of fact sees fit. For example, in Haslip v. Paci$c Mutual 
3 3. Fairness Act, mpra note 1, 5 202(c). 
34. Id. 8 203(a). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
3 7. See, c.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675 (Arii. 1986); Reed v. Central 
SoyaCo., 62 1 N.E.2d 1069Ond. 1993);Tudev. Raymond,494A.Zd 1353 (Me. 1985); Owens-Illinois, 
Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992); Obergv. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1993). 
But see, e.g., Seventh Judicial Di t .  Asbestos Litii., 593 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (App. Div. 199 3) (preponder- 
ance of evidence standard). 
38. See, cg., Firstbank of Ark. v. Keeling, 850 S.W.2d 3 10 (Ark. 1993); White v. Hansen, 81 3 
P.2d 750 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Sullivan v. American Casualty Co., 605 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. 1992); 
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 558 A.2d 768 (Md. 1989); Bishop v. Bostick, 529 N.Y.S.2d 116 
(App. Div. 1988); Shellhorn v. Kohler Chrysler-Plymouth, No.16-92-29, 1993 WL 264613 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 15, 1993); Via v. Production Credit Ass'n, No. 1, 1989 WL 48453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
May 9, 1989); LaPlaca v. Odeh, 428 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1993). 
39. Fairness Act, wpra note 1, 8 203(e). 
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Insurance the Supreme Court found unobjectionable Alabama punitive dam- 
ages standards that included most of the Fairness Act factors (although not the 
prospective civil award factor), but identified only two-imposition of criminal 
sanctions and existence of other civil awards-as appropriate for consideration in 
mitigation.41 
For claims involving prescription drugs and medical devices, the Fairness Act 
states that punitive damages are not to be awarded against manufacturers or product 
sellers if the drug or device in question was subjected to  FDA prernarket approval 
or "is generally recognized as safe and effective pursuant to  conditions established 
by" the F D A . ~ ~  A similar conditional immunity is afforded manufacturers of aircraft 
or aircraft components who have received FAA certification and have satisfied 
postapproval reporting ~bl i~a t ions .~ '  
G. Appmrwnment of Nonecunumic Loss 
Lastly and significantly, section 206  of the Fairness Act provides that a defendant's 
liability for noneconomic loss is to  be several only, with judgment to be entered 
in proportion to the defendant's "percentage of responsibility."44 
111. COUNCIL DRAFT NO. 1, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
A. Zntroductiun 
The subjects of Council Draft No. 1 are "Product Defectiveness," "Causation," 
and "Affirmative  defense^."^' Like S. 687,  the draft Restatement addresses only 
a subpart of the many legal issues affecting products liability. Unlike S. 687,  how- 
ever, there is no political impediment to the Institute's plan to return to the subject 
over the next decade, reconciling and rationalizing tort doctrine one step at a time. 
B .  Manufa~curing, Design, and Znjbnnational Defects 
Sections 10  1, 102, and 103 of the Council Draft establish standards for product 
defectiveness. The authors state that "[rlather than perpetuatingconfusion spawned 
by existing doctriial categories [i.e., strict liability, warranty, and negligence], Sec- 
40. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
41. Id. at 2 1-24. Sngmlly 2 M. STUARTMADDEN. PRODUC~SLIABILITY 5 22.3 (2d ed. Supp. 
1993). 
42. Fairness Act, supra note 1, 5 203(bX1). 
43; Id. 5 203(c). 
4 4 .  Id. 5 206(a). 
45. Council Draft No. 1 was preceded by an April 20, 1993, Preliminary Draft. Sn gmraUy 
Preliminary Draft, nrpra note 4. A Preliminary Draft and a Council Draft each play a role in the 
maturation of an eventual Restatement. The Preliminary Draft of a potential Restatement is, in every 
sense, preliminary. It represents the work, synthesis, and approach of its authors and is exclusively the 
work of the reporters. It is the fm of many stages of an eventual Restatement. 
In the months following distribution of the Products Liibility Preliminary Draft the Reporters and 
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tion 101 defines the liability for each form of defect in functional terms."% These 
"functional terms" are familiar: manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure 
to  instruct o r  warn.47 Section 10 1, entitled "Commercial Seller's Liability for Harm 
Caused by Defective Products," states: 
(a) One engaged in the business of selling products who sells a product in a defective 
condition is subject to liability for harm to persons or  property caused by the product 
defect. 
(b) Liability under Subsection (a) may be based on: (1) a manufacturing defect . . . 
though al l  possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product; 
(2) a design defect if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . or (3) a defect 
consisting of failure to instruct or warn if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced by the adoption of reasonable instructions and 
48 warnings. . . . 
Comment a t o  section 101, while acknowledging that liability for each form 
of defect is defined in functional terms, recognizes that many courts insist upon 
using "strict liability" language in design and failure to  warn cases.49 According 
to  the Reporters, there are several reasons for this preference. First, in the area of 
design defect, "if a product causes injury while being put t o  a reasonably foreseeable 
use, the seller is held to  have known of the risks that attend such use."s0 Also, 
some courts have tried to limit the defense of comparative fault by characterizing 
the liability test as being "strict," rather than based in negligence, thereby applying 
comparative o r  contributory fault "in a more restrictive fashion."" Moreover, a 
negligence standard might preclude a finding of liability against a small manufacturer 
if the factfinder believed that it was "too burdensome for [the manufacturer] t o  
discover some risks o r  t o  design o r  warn against them."s2 Finally, the Reporters 
explain that courts' "rhetorical preference" for "strict liability" accurately reflects 
that the liability of nonmanufaauring sellers is and remains "strict" because it is 
"no defense that they acted reasonably and were not aware of a defect in the 
product, be it manufacturing, design, o r  f d u r e  to warn."s3 The  Reporters conclude 
that courts (and presumably legislatures) "can choose t o  employ existing doctrinal 
the ALI underrook a commendable effort to invite and consider views of  a wide spectrum of the 
practicing bar, law professors, and members of  the judiciary. On basis of these comments, Professors 
Henderson and Twerski prepared Council Draft N o .  1 .  
46. Council Draft, wpra note 5, 5 101 cmt. a, at 6 .  
47. See id. 5 101(b). 
48. Id. 5 101. 
49. Id. cmt. a, at 5. 
50. Id. 
5 1 .  Id. at 5-6. 
52. Id. at 6 .  
53. Id. at 5-6. 
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structure or simply define liability in the functional terms set forth in the black 
letter."s4 
1. Manufacturing Defects 
The Council Draft definition of a manufacturing defect is expanded over that of 
the Preliminary Draft. A manufacturing defect in both is defined as "a departure 
from a product unit's design ~~eci f ica t ions ."~~ Both also impute liability to a down- 
the-chain seller for defects that arise after manufacture, for example, duringshipment 
or storage. However, the Council Draft makes it clear that "[wlhen the manufac- 
turer delegates some aspect of the manufacture, such as final assembly or inspection, 
to a down-thechain seller, the manufacturer may be subject to liability under rules 
of vicarious liability for a defect that was introduced into the product after it left 
the hands of the man~facturer ."~~ 
The Reporters specifically rejected any requirement that a claimant prove a manu- 
facturing defect be "unreasonably dangerous."" The reasons given are that (1) the 
imposition of such a requirement "would place a needless burden on plaintiff"; (2) 
there are virtually no cases "where a product contains a manufacturing defect that 
is the cause of the plaintiffs injury but is not 'unreasonably dangerous' "; and (3) the 
functional definition of manufacturingdefect adopted in section 10 I(b)(l) "has been 
utilized by courts and has caused no difficulty in application."58 
Section 102 of the Council Draft was completely rewritten to provide for an 
inference of defect only in the context of manufacturiing defectsf9 It states: "When 
a product malfunctions and causes harm under circumstances where it is more 
probable than not that the malfunction was caused, by a manufacturing defect, the 
trier of fact may infer that such a defect caused the harm and plaintiff need not 
specify the nature of such defect."60 Preliminary Draft section 102 contained no 
such limitation to manufacturing defects. The policy reason for allowing an inference 
of defect is to permit recovery when the product is destroyed or consumed, thus 
inhibiting a finding of what specifically went wrong with the product.61 Limiting 
the inference to manufacturing defects is sensible, the Reporters explain, for two 
reasons: (1) "[n]umerous commentators [note that it is] impossible to conjure up 
a failure-to-warn case that would fall within the requisites of Section 102[;]"~~ and 
(2) design defect cases "are not cases where evidence of defect is unavailable[;] 
54. Id. at 7. 
55. Id. 5 101 cmt. f, at 14; Preliminary Draft, rupa  note 4, 5 101 cmt. f, at 17. 
56. Council Draft, supra note 5, 5 101 cmt. f, at 14 (emphasis added). 
57. Reporters' Guide to Revisions Made to Preliminary Draft No. 1 .  Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability, at ii (Sept. 10, 1993) [hereinafter Guide]. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at v. 
60. Council Draft. rupra note 5. 5 102. 
6 1 .  See id. cmt. a, at 1 18. 
62. Guide. supra note 57, at v. 
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. . . the error is on the drawing board, [and] it is available in the design plans of 
the product."6' 
2 .  Design Defects 
Section 101 of the Preliminary Draft provided that a case for design defect liability 
would be established "if the foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product 
could have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable, safer design."64 The 
Council Draft instead reads: "if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative de~ign."~' 
Explaining the revision, the Reporters state that "reasonable alternative design" is 
the phrase most frequently used by the courts66 and that use of the term "safer" 
would be redundant, for "if the alternative design reduces the foreseeable risks of 
the harm posed by the product, it is by definition safer."67 Finally, the Reporters 
note that the design offered by the plaintiff must be a "reasonable alternative" to 
the design in question.68 Although "[tlhe proffered design may be safer[, it] may 
not be a 'reasonable alternative to the defendant's product. r ,169 
The Reporters emphasize that the well-known "consumer expectations" test is 
"not an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product  design^."^' 
In their words, the test for design defect properly employs a " 'risk-utility' balancing" 
to  determine defectiveness in the context of design." This test is "the standard for 
j u d p g  the defectiveness of product designs"72 and obligates "plaintiff [to] prove 
that the seller or  a predecessor in the distributive chain faded to adopt a reasonable 
alternative design that would, at acceptable cost, have reduced the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the product."7' 
A risk-utility balancing test is unmistakably the test for determining the reason- 
ableness of a "reasonable alternative design." The Council Draft discusses the 
restrictions of "reasonable alternative design" more fully than had the Preliminary 
Draft. In evaluating any proposed alternative design, consideration must be given 
to  the cost of designing the alternative and whether the alternative would provide 
greater overall safety.74 The Reporters explain: "It is not sufficient that the alterna- 
63. Id. at vi. 
64. Preliminary Draft, supra note 4, 8 lOl(z)(b) (emphasis added). 
65. Council Draft, rupra note 5, 5 101(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
66. Guide, supra note 57. at i. 
67. Id. 
68. Id 
69. Id. at ii; sa also Council Drafr, supra note 5 , s  10 1 cmt. h ("Design defect: Reasonable Alternative 
Design"). 
70. Council Draft, supra note 5, 5 101 cmt. i ,  at 27. However, the Reporters state that "the nature 
and strength of consumer expectations," inter alia, may be considered when deciding the reasonableness of 
a product design. Id. 5 101 cmt. h, at 22. 
71. Id. 8 701 cmt. g, at 16. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 16-17. 
74. Sn gnvrally id. 5 101 cmt. h. 
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tive design would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by the plaintiff if 
it would also introduce into the product other dangers of equal or greater magnitude. 
Such an alternative design could not be considered to  be rea~onable."~' Cost and 
consumer preference may be considered as well. An alternative design may provide 
greater safety, "but only by substantially increasingthe monetary cost of the product 
or by significantly reducing its attractiveness to consumers by decreasing the benefits 
of use and consumption."76 
The Reporters' proposed liability standards reject the "open and obvious" or 
"patent danger" rule as a total bar to a design defect claim, relegating "obviousness" 
to the role of "one factor among many to consider as to whether a product design 
meets risk-utility norms."77 However, the Reporters state that there is no duty to 
warn about obvious dangers.78 Explaining the compatibility of a rule that obvious- 
ness is no automatic bar to a design defect claim with one that preserves obviousness 
as an exculpatory factor in warning cases, Professors Henderson and Twerski cite 
their own earlier commentary: 
[Tlhe argument for abandoning the patent danger rule in warning cases, simply because 
the rule has been abandoned in design cases, makes no sense. In the design care, the 
obviousness ofthe danger does not necessarily preclude the possibility that an alternative 
design could reduce the risk cost-effectively. By contrast, assuming that some risks are 
patently obvious, the obviousness of a product-related risk invariably serves the same 
function as a warning that the risk is present. Thus, nothing is to be gained by adding 
a warning of the danger already telegraphed by the product itself.79 
3. Informational Defects (Warnings and Instructions) 
Section 10 l(b)(3) adopts a reasonableness test in judging the adequacy of warningss0 
similar to the reasonableness test of section 10l(b)(2) for design defects." The 
Council Draft emphasizes the difficulty of applying this standard in the context of 
failure to instruct or warn, recognizing, inter alia, that the effectiveness of a warning 
may be reduced by (1) the existence of too many warnings (which increases the 
likelihood that they will be ignored), (2) an inappropriate degree of intensity in 
the transmission of the warning, and (3) the inclusion of "trivial or far-fetched 
Liability for design defect and fdure to warn claims will attach only when the 
75. Id. at 22. 
76. Id. at 21. 
77. Id. 5 101 reporters' notes, at 69. A majority of the courts have rejected the "open and obvious" 
or "patent danger" rule. Id. at 69-70. 
78. Id 5 101 cmt. k, at 3 1 .  
79. Id. 5 101 reporters' notes, at 97-98 (quoting James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, 
W m l  Collapse in Pr& W l i y :  lh Empry Sbd of Failure w Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 
306 (1990)). 
80. See id. 5 101 101(b)(3). 
81. Id. 5 101 cmt. j, at 29. 
82. Id. 
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product has been put to a reasonably foreseeable use.s3 The Council Draft reflects 
one substantive change from the Preliminary Draft in this area. The Preliminary 
Draft took the position that if a use of a product (excluding prescription drugs and 
toxic products) is foreseeable, the manufacturer is charged with the knowledge of 
risks arising therefr~m.'~ Recognizing that imputing knowledge to the manufacturer 
in all cases has little judicial and scholarly support,s' the Council Draft places upon 
plaintiff the burden of showing that the risks of harm were known or should 
have been known at the time of man~facture. '~ However, the Reporters make an 
exception in the case of mechanical products, providing that if plaintiff establishes 
that a mechanical product was put to a reasonably foreseeable use, it is not necessary 
for the plaintiff to prove that the seller knew or should have known of the risks 
that would ariie from such foreseeable use." The Reporters explain: "We see no 
good reason to burden plaintiffs with proving the foreseeability of risks arising 
from foreseeable uses of mechanical products. The reality is that, almost by defmi- 
tion, once the use [of a mechanical product] is foreseeable, the risks which attend 
such use are foreseeable."'' 
C. Prescription h g s  and Medical Devices 
Section 10 3 of the Council Draft pertains to  liability for prescription drugs and medi- 
cal devices and posits that the plaintiff should prevail only if (1) there was a "manufac- 
turing defect"; or (2) "reasonable instructions and warnings . . . were not provided 
to prescribing and other medical providers . . ."; or (3) "reasonable instructions and 
warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm . . . were not provided directly to the 
patient when: (i) the manufacturer knew or  had reason to know that no medical 
provider was in the position [to reduce the risk of harm]," or (ii) FDA regulations 
require direct warnings, or (iii) "the manufacturer advertised or otherwise promoted 
the drug or medical device directly to users and consumers;" or (4) the "reasonably 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or  medical device were sufficiently great 
in relation to its therapeutic benefits that a reasonable medical provider . . . would 
not prescribe the drug or medical device . . . ."89 Cognizant of the nearly uniform 
adoption of comment k to Restatement (Second) ofTorts section 402A, the Council 
Draft "specifically exclude[s] prescription drugs, chemicals and toxics from imputed 
knowledge."90 
83. Sa id 8 101 cmt. m, at 34. 
84. Set Preliminary Drafi, nrpra note 4, 5 101. 
85. Srr Council Draft, supra note 5, 5 101 reporters' notes, at 104-05. The Reporters cite the 
observation of Dean John Wade: " 'I think there is no longer any particular value in using the assumed 
knowledge language.' " Id. (quoting John W.  Wade. On tbr Effect in Pr& Lability o f  Knowlea'ge 
Unavailable Prim to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L.'REv. 734, 764 (1983)). 
86. Sa id 6 101 cmt. m, at 34-36. 
87. Id. at 35. 
88. Id. 5 101 reporter' notes, at 101. 
89. Id. 5 103(a). 
90. Id. 5 101 reporter' notes, at 101. 
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Section 103 of the Council Draft contains several important changes in the black 
letter rule as originally written in the Preliminary Draft. Most importantly, while 
the Reporters preserve the orthodox rule that the manufacturer's informational 
obligation for prescription products is satisfied by providing adequate warnings to 
the medical profession,91 they have included several exceptions. Comments received 
by the Reporters indicated that both plaintiffs and defendants were unhappy with 
the original text of the Preliminary  raft,^' which simply included a "caveat" at 
the end of the black letter rule stating that the "[American Law] Institute takes 
no position as to whether persons other than the medical providers . . . should 
receive instructions and warnings about the risks presented by prescription drugs 
or medical  device^."^' Plaintiffs' lawyers, among others, wanted acknowledgment 
that in some instances even sellers of prescription drugs should be required to 
convey warning information directly to the patient.94 Those arguing the interests 
of defendants were equally dissatisfied because the subject was left wide open and 
without guidance.95 
The Reporters responded to these criticisms with a rule that attempts to reflect 
"the instances in which courts have justifiably allowed inroads into the learned 
intermediary' rule."96 Section 103(a)(3) of the Council Draft thus recognizes that 
direct warnings or instructions to patients are warranted for drugs or medical devices 
that are dispensed to patients by prescription (a) when "the manufacturer knew 
or had reason to know that no medical provider was in the position [to receive 
the warnings and reduce the risk of harm]"; (b) when FDA regulations require 
direct warnings; or (c) when "the manufacturer advertised or otherwise promoted 
the drug or medical device directly to users and consumers . . . ."97 
In another change from the Preliminary Draft, the standard for defective design 
of a prescription drug or medical device, originally articulated in the Reporters' 
comments,98 now appears in the black letter text.99 Under section 103(a)(4) the 
91. See id. Q 103 cmt. d. 
92. Guide, nrpra note 57, at vi. 
93. Preliminary Draft, supra note 4, Q 103 caveat, at 108. 
94. Guide, supra note 57, at vi; see, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(manufacturer of polio vaccination had duty to convey riik warnings directly to population to be 
vaccinated when circumstances of vaccination of large numbers of persons eliminated presumption of 
individualized treatment and communication that underlies informed intermediary doctrine); Macdonald 
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cnt. h i r d ,  474 U.S. 920 (1985) (manufacturer 
of oral contraceptives had duty to provide warnings directly to patients due to distinctive nature of 
physician-patient relationship for such prescriptions, the substantial risks associated with the product's 
use, and the feasibility of direct warnings). 
95. Guide, supra note 57, at vi. 
96. Id. 
97. Council Draft, nrpra note 5, Q 103(a)(3). The Reporters note that judicial authority supports 
the requirement of direct warning in cases (a) and (b). Id. Q 103 reporters' notes, at 146-47. They 
concede, however, that there is no judicial authority supporting direct warning in case (c), but assert 
that "common sense notions of fairness" support their position. Id. at 147. 
98. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 4, 5 103 cmt. e, at 1 1 3. 
99. See Council Draft, rupra note 5, Q 103(a)(4). 
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drug or device must "have so little merit compared with its risks that no reasonable 
medical provider, possessing knowledge of risks that were known or reasonably 
should have been known to the drug or device manufacturer, would have prescribed 
the drug or device to any dass of patients."'" The Reporters explain: 
The thrust of the rule is that a drug design cannot be declared defective as long as 
there are patients for whom the drug can and should be prescribed. No ascertainable 
class of patients should be deprived of a drug merely because some medical providers 
may misprescribe the drug. . . . To [hold the drug defective] would effectively deny 
the drug to patients for whom it is, appropriately, the drug of choice.lOl 
D. Causation 
Council Draft section 104 states that whether a product defect caused a claimant's 
harm is to be determined by the rules and principles governing causation in tort, 
subject to an exception for enhanced harm/crashworthiness causation questions 
treated in section 105 .~~ '  
1. Proportional Causation 
The Preliminary Draft included a "caveat" that left open for discussion the issue 
of proportional liability (including, inter alia, market share liability).lO' The Council 
Draft similarly leaves the question open by not takinga firm position on proportional 
liability. However, the comments identify factors for a court to consider when 
deciding whether to adopt such a rule. These include: (a) the generic nature of 
the defect; (b) the long latency period of the injury; (c) the inability of plaintiffs 
to discover the identity of the defendant even after exhaustive discovery; (d) the 
clarity of the causal connection between the defective product and the injury suffered 
, . 
by plaintiffs; (e) the absence of medical or environmental factors that could have 
caused or  materially contributed to the injury; and (f) the availability of sufficient 
market share data to allow a rational apportionment of liability.lO" The Reporters 
make it clear that "the [American Law] Institute leaves to developing case law the 
question of whether, given the appropriate factors, a rule of proportional liability 
should be adopted,"lO' but suggest strongly that "should a court adopt some form 
of proportional liability, the liability should be several, reflecting only the individual 
defendant's share of the market."lo6 
2. Concurrent Causation 
Council Draft section 10s treats an issue often raised in crashworthiness cases: 
whether the injured claimant or the defendant manufacturer must satisfy the burden 
100. Id. 8 103 cmt. b, at 132. 
101. Guide, nrpra note 57, at vii. 
102. Council Draft, supra note 5, 8 104. 
103. Preliminary Draft, supra note 4, 5 104 caveat. at 125. 
1 0 4 .  Council Drafi, supra note 5, 5 104 crnt. c, at 159-60. 
105. Id. at 160. 
106. Id. 
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of proving the actual apportionment of damages when the manufacturer's defective 
product enhances an injury caused by a third party and/or the claimant. Specifically, 
the Reporters resolve the conflict between the Third Circuit rule, established in 
Huddel v. Levin,''' and decisions such as Oklahoma's Lee v. Volkswagenwerk of 
~rnerica.lO~ Council Draft section 105 states: 
(a) When a product is found to be defective within the meaning of Section 101 and 
the defect increases the harm suffered by a victim as a result of other causes, the 
product seller is subject to liability for increasing the harm. The plaintiff is not required 
to prove the extent ofthe defect-caused increase, but only that such an increase occurred. 
(b) When the plaintiff proves defect-caused increase in harm, the product seller is liable 
for all of the harm suffered by the victim from both the defect and the other causes 
unless the seller proves the extent of the defect-caused increase, in which event the 
seller's liability is limited to the extent of such increase. 
(c) In connection with determining the extent of the defect-related increase in harm 
under subsection (b), the court should make such rulings regarding the admissibility 
and sufficiency of evidence as will, consistent with considerations of fairness to all 
concerned, facilitate apportionment. 
(d) When a seller of a defective product is held liable for pan or all the harm suffered 
by the victim under the rule stated in subsection (b), the liability is joint and several 
with all other parties who bear responsibility for causing the harm, determined by 
applicable rules of joint and several liability.'09 
Significantly, section 105(b) places upon plaintiff the initial burden of proving 
that the product was defective and that the defect was the cause of enhanced 
injuries. Upon such a showing, "the product seller is subject t o  liability for all the 
harm suffered by the victim from both the defect and other causes unless the selfer 
proves the extent of the defect-caused increase."'1° This provision would encourage 
a holding similar t o  the majority position in b e  and discourage results following 
Huddel, which required the plaintiff to  prove the extent of enhancement damages."' 
While some support for the Huddel view  exist^,"^ the Reporters note that most 
writers support placing this burden on  defendants."' 
Subsection (c) of section 105 is a new addition to  the Preliminary Draft version. 
This subsection urges courts to  allow apportionment when feasible by lessening 
107. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). 
108. 688 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1984). 
109. Council Draft, supra note 5, 5 105. 
110. Id. cmt. c, at 177 (emphasis added). 
I l l .  Sa Huddell, 537 F.2d at 738. 
1 12. Council Drafi, supra note 5 , §  105 reporters' notes, at 203-04 (citing, inter alia, Barry Levenstam 
& Daryl J. Lapp, Plainttfs Burah ofproving Enbanced Injury in Crarbwonbituss Clres: A C h b  Wortby 
A m ~ s i s ,  38 DEPAUL L. REV. 55 (1989)). 
1 1  3 .  Id. at 203 (citing, inter alia, Stanton P. Beck, Enbanad Injury: A Directimtfor W a s b i n p ,  61 
WASH. L. REV. 571 (1986)). 
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the evidentiary burden. Courts are asked "to listen to apportionment evidence and 
to let the jury decide the apportionment issue whenever it is feasible.""4 
E .  Afirmative Defenses 
Sections 106 and 107 of the Council Draft treat affirmative defenses. 
Section 106, entitled "Apportionment of Responsibility between Plaintiff and 
the Product Seller," states: 
When the conduct of the plaintiff combines with a product defect to cause harm to 
the plaintiffs person or  property and the plaintiffs conduct fails to conform to an 
applicable standard of care, responsibility for harm to the plaintiff shall be apportioned 
between the plaintiff and the seller of the defective product pursuant to the applicable 
rules governing apportionment of responsibility."' 
Section 106 is substantively unchanged from the Preliminary Draft and reflects 
a policy conclusion that "[ilt would be unfair to  impose the costs of substandard 
plaintiff conduct on manufacturers, who will be impelled to pass on those costs 
to  all users and consumers, including those who use and consume products 
safely and reasonably."l16 The Preliminary Draft left open the questions whether 
any forms of plaintiff conduct should be considered in comparative fault and 
whether any exceptions should be made immunizing plaintiffs from comparative 
fault based on the type of product defect involved."' While not a panacea to 
problems involving plaintiff fault, section 106 now addresses these concerns by 
stating that "all forms of plaintiffs failure to conform to applicable standards 
of care should be presented to the trier of fact for the purpose of apportioning 
responsibility between the plaintiff and the product seller.""' In the view of 
the Reporters, however, "the relative innocence or  seriousness of plaintiffs 
fault . . . should not serve automatically to  absolve the plaintiff from fault o r  
bar the plaintiff from recovery.""9 
In the final section of the proposed Products Liability Restatement, the Reporters 
suggest that sellers should not be able to rely upon disclaimers and waivers in 
connection with products liability claims involving personal physical injury. Council 
Draft section 107 states: 
Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers, waivers by product purchas- 
ers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral o r  written, do not bar or reduce 
otherwise valid products liability claims for harm to persons.'20 
1 14. Guide, supra note 57, at ix. 
115. Council Draft, supra note 5, 5 106. 
116. Id. cmt. a, at 216. 
117. See Preliminary Draft, rupra note 4, 5 106 cmt. d, at 174. 
11 8. Council Draft, rupra note 5, 5 106 cmt. d. at 2 19. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 5 107. 
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This section, following the influential warranty decision of Henningsen v. Blomjeld 
121 Motor, Inc., provides an irrebuttable presumption that the "plaintiff lacked suffi- 
cient information, bargaining power, or bargaming position necessary to execute 
a fair contractual limitation of rights to  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Victor E. Schwanz, a leading private-sector proponent of federalization of products 
liability law, recently testified: "In the past dozen years, over a dozen states have 
passed some form of product liability legislation. All this leplation is different and 
has continued the Tower of Babel style product liability law we have in the United 
States."12' Product liability leda t ion  of varying stripes has been introduced in 
Congress annually for over a decade. 
S. 687 reveals several strategic compromises presumably based upon criticism 
of earlier bills. The claimant who refuses to participate in ADR cannot be penalized, 
while the defendant who refuses ADR in bad faith can be penalized in the amount 
of the claimant's attorneys' fees occasioned thereby, a decidedly consumer-favorable 
amendment. The expedited product liability claim procedure in a previous bill, S. 
6 4 0 , ' ~ ~  was interpreted by critics as placing a penalty in the amount of defendant's 
legal costs upon a claimant who refused an offer of settlement and thereafter received 
a judgment for less than the settlement offer.I2' S. 687 would confine such a 
plaintiffs penalty to the amount of collateral benefits the plaintiff received, while 
preserving a penalty of up to 8 50,000 of the plaintiffs legal costs for a defendant 
who, following rejection of plaintiffs offer, fails to do better at trial. Lastly, S. 
687 manifests greater sensitivity to  consumer concerns in its punitive damages 
provisions providing immunity from punitive damages to pharmaceutical companies 
and aircraft manufacturers who have received federal approval to market their 
products. S. 687 makes dear that even following agency approval, drug companies 
and aircraft makers have a continuing duty to report safety-related information to 
their governing agencies. 
The proposed legdation reconciles competing societal, ton policy, and legal 
interest-group objectives in ways unachieved by its predecessors. Its punitive dam- 
ages provisions are basically sound, and its flaws can be remedied by simple delinea- 
tion of factors that should be considered only in mitigation or only in aggravation. 
The immunization from punitive damage vulnerability of products with prior FDA 
or FAA approval simply recognizes the de facto approach adopted in leading judicial 
121. 161 A.2d 69, 94-95 (N.J. 1960). 
122. Council Draft, supra note 5, 8 107 cmt. a, at 232. 
12 3 .  Testimony of Victor E. Schwartz, Esq., before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transporta- 
tion Committee on September 23, 1993. 
124. S. 640, lO2d Cong., In Sess. tit. I1 (199 1). 
125. See, e.g., S. Rep. No.  2 15, lO2d Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86 (1991) (minority views of Senators 
Hollings and Gore). 
126. Fairness Act, rupra note 1 ,  88  203(bX2)(A), 203(c)(Z)(A). 
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opinions throughout the country.'27 Its adoption of a negiigence standard for prod- 
ucts liability involving nonmanufacturing sellers, although a departure from the 
current majority rule preserving stria tort liability, preserves a plaintiffs strict 
liability claim when the manufacturer cannot be served successfully. In this sense 
the Fairness Act is more favorable to plaintiffs than the many state statutes that 
have endeavored to protect retailers from strict products liability through such 
devices as "closed container" and "no duty to inspect" rules,Iz8 but provide no 
exception for manufacturer unavdability. 
If there is to be a federal products liability law, S. 687 stands out as being 
measured and moderate. Seemingly free of the politicization that affected earlier 
efforts, it addresses only those matters most critical to its proponents and does so with 
proposed law that fairly reflects the better rule throughout the states. Moreover, its 
expedited judgment and dispute resolution rules can only create economies for 
courts and litigants alike, with the savings passed on to consumers and shareholders. 
These latter provisions should become models for state legislatures throughout the 
country. 
A Restatement represents the consensus of its reporters, the ALI Council, and 
the ALI membership that its black letter provisions and accompanying Reporter's 
Notes reflect the best rule of law, consistent with decided cases, on a particular 
subject. The Institute's goals have been described as the rationalization or reconcilia- 
- 
tion of incompatible decisional law and the explanation of superior rules and their 
rationales in such a way that a state high court considering an issue as a matter 
of first impression would be stimulated to adopt the Restatement position.129 
In the main, Council Draft No. 1 has accomplished this. Observers cannot 
realistically expect material departure from core provisions of the Council Draft 
upon their statement of how the law should be, absent a showing that the Reporters 
have misinterpreted modern decisional authority. 
Congress and the ALI seem to have constructed quite divergent realities. What 
is one to make of the different legislative and ALI initiatives? The ALI, responsible 
- 
for promulgation of the enormously influential Restatement (Second) of Tons 
section 402A, now embarks upon a Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
without apparent recognition of at least eight years of congressional effort in prod- 
ucts liability reform. The House and the Senate, in turn, serve up new draft Fairness 
Acts that cast no more than a sideways glance at the developing common law, 
127. Cf: Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Co., 577 P.2d 1332, 1332 (Or. 1978) (evaluating substantive 
expertise of FAA approval process). 
128. E.g., Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972) ("We are unwilling to 
extend the rule of strict products liability in ton to the wholesaler and retailer . . . [when the] shoes 
were never out of their [original container] until the retailer transferred them from the box to a [nore 
rack]."); Padron v. Goodyear T i e  & Rubber Co., 662 P.2d 67. 7 0  (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) ("[Tlhe 
duty to inspect or test for defects lies with the manufacturer rather than the retailer."). 
129. See, c.g., RE~TATEMENTOFTORTS introduction, at iii-iv (student ed. 1934). In produw liability 
this archetype is increasingly rare, as the highest courts in most juriidictions have reviewed and decided 
most elements of products liability claims and defenses. 
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including empirical demonstrations that plaintiff judgments already are in a down- 
ward swing in such bellwether jurisdictions as California. 
The principal reason for the distinct realities is that Congress and the ALI have 
altogether different aims and purposes. Congress is charged with effecting, in legisla- 
tion, and within constitutional limitations, the urges and needs of its individual 
members' constituents. This, of course, is not its only charge. The ALI has a 
different mandate. It was formed and continues to aspire to  rationalize, synthesize, 
and make more effective and progressive existing common law or bodies of law 
represented, as is products liability, by both common law and statutes. Thus the 
ALI is restrained from introducing dynamic, even untested experiments in the civil 
justice system. It is a limitation that cedes to Congress the role of promulgating 
devices such as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and settlement when 
such devices, at least for now, have no widespread presence in state statutes or 
decisional law. The ton  bar and the judiciary can expect Congress to continue to  
use tort reform as a laboratory, and substantive products liability law as the Petri 
dish, for its experiments in economic and judicial efficiency. 
V. POSTSCRIPT 
Council draft 1A was published January 4, 1994, and approved by the ALI Council 
at its meeting on March 4 with revisions. The Reporters are incorporating the 
requested revisions and plan to publish a Tentative Draft before the May 1994 
ALI meeting, when a discussion of the draft Restatement is scheduled. 
The most significant changes in Council Draft 1A were: 
In section 10 1, new section 1, the black letter now states that to prove defective 
design or defect due to inadequate warnings or instructions, plaintiff must establish 
that the omission of reasonable alternative warnings or instructions renders the 
product "not reasonably safe." 
In comment language the Draft recognizes that some narrow categories or prod- 
ucts, such as certain hazardous toys, may be defined as " 'not reasonably safe' 
whether or not an alternative design is suggested." 
Council Draft 1 A deleted from the black letter language proposing an exception 
to the learned intermediary rule for prescription products advertised directly to 
patients. 
Finally, Draft 1A's "enhanced injury" rule now states that the "defect must be 
a substantial factor in causing increasing harm beyond that which would have been 
suffered by the plaintiff from non-defect related causes." In addition, Draft 1A 
does not formally shift to the defendant the burden to prove the extent of the 
enhanced harm. Nevertheless, when the proof does not support apportionment, 
the defendant is jointly and severally liable. 
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